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The flight of Apollo 11 was the end of a decade-long race to 
reach the moon, a race between the US and Soviet Union, but also a 
race with time, for we as a nation only had the 1960s to reach our 
objective.  Most of us remember that particular day—July 20, 
1969—but the further we are from any date the harder it is to recall 
details. It’s easy to forget, for instance, how close together the 
Apollo flights came to each other as the lunar flight date 
approached.  Apollo 7 circled Earth for almost 11 days testing the 
systems of the spacecraft in October 1968; Apollo 8 gave us the first 
glimpse of our entire planet while circling the moon during 
Christmas of 1968.  Apollo 9 lifted off on March 3 of 1969, and 
Apollo 10 returned to Earth on May 26 of that year. Less than two 
months later, on 16 July, Apollo 11 lifted off on its mission of 
landing on the moon.  That’s five Apollo launches in ten months, 
three of which went to the moon.  
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That Apollo 11’s Armstrong and Aldrin landed safely—and 
returned successfully—is the result of a lengthy and dangerous 
program on Earth, a program that took place not far from here, in 
fact, at what is today the NASA Dryden Flight Research Center, at 
Edwards Air Force Base. 
Today’s story begins on May 25, 1961, when president John F. 
Kennedy issued his now-famous challenge to put a man on the 
moon and return him safely again to Earth. With the intervening 
years it’s not easy to keep this challenge in perspective, so let me 
offer a few neighboring events in 1961. Mickey Mantle became the 
highest paid baseball player that year, with an annual salary of 
$75,000; in-flight movies were introduced by TWA; a gallon of gas 
cost .27 cents; Wagon Train was the most popular show on tv; 
Runaway by Del Shannon was a hit on the radio, and both Chico 
Marx and Gary Cooper died that year. On May 5, less than three 
weeks before Kennedy’s challenge, NASA placed a human into space, 
Alan Sheppard. That came in response to the Soviets, of course, who 
sent Yuri Gagarin into orbit on 12 April of 1961. The US had been 
playing catch-up with the Soviets for nearly five years by then, and 
Kennedy’s challenge was intended to change that, to give the 
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Americans the lead in space, and to demonstrate to the world that 
we weren’t second fiddle on the global scene.  
Kennedy’s challenge electrified much of the country but it 
floored most NASA engineers. Indeed, “no one” at NASA’s Langley 
Research Center “could quite believe it.” The leader of the Space 
Task Group at Langley was simply “aghast,” noted historian James R. 
Hansen.1 Not that going into space was a new idea to engineers at 
NASA, or its predecessor, the National Advisory Committee for 
Aeronautics. NACA engineers had been discussing putting humans 
into space since the early 1950s. But thinking about orbital flight is 
not the same thing as planning for an excursion to the moon’s 
surface. Just getting to lunar orbit, never mind how to reach its 
surface, was a daunting task.  
Interestingly, two organizations were thinking about the same 
thing, unaware of the other’s activities in the matter: the astronauts 
would need something to simulate here on Earth the descent to, and 
landing on, the moon. These two organizations were the NASA Flight 
                                                
1 James R. Hansen Spaceflight Revolution: NASA Langley Research Center From Sputnik 
to Apollo (Washington, D.C.: NASA SP-4308, 1995), chapter 8, “Enchanted 
Rendezvous: The Lunar-Orbit Rendezvous Concept,” in which there is a fascinating 
account of the internal competition among NASA engineers and scientists to devise a 
means of reaching, landing on the moon, and returning to Earth. p. 221-268. 
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Research Center at Edwards AFB, (today Dryden) and the Bell 
Aircraft Corp in Niagara Falls, NY, 
The task they contemplated is not as easy as it seems.  
Chief among the challenges was simulating the moon’s gravity, 
which is 1/6th that of Earth’s. How, in the early 1960s, are you going 
to do this with a wingless aircraft? What method will you use to 
negate 5/6th of the Earth’s gravitational pull in flight or the 
atmospheric forces at play? How will you compensate for the fuel 
you burn off while in flight? Need I remind you of the state of 
computing in 1962, and more importantly, of portable computers?  
The operative words here are big, heavy and analog. And how will 
you control and maneuver the vehicle in a lunar simulation? 
And what are you going to use to keep your simulator up in 
the air?  The engineers had in mind a vehicle with no wings, could 
transition in any direction at 15 mph, yet could also hover in place.  
The group at the Flight Research Center, or FRC, looked at 
three possible simulators: helicopters, vertical take off and landing, 
and short take off and landing vehicles. A little digging revealed 
that the Naval Ordnance Test Station at China Lake had been 
conducting simulated unmanned lunar landings since 1959 with a 
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700-pound flying vehicle powered by unsymmetric dimethyl 
hydrazine mixed with red fuming nitric acid as fuel. The vehicle was 
constrained by four cables suspended from the top of a 150-foot 
tower and was controlled entirely from the ground. All of this was 
interesting, but not that helpful to the group from the FRC, and they 
continued their search for options. Bell engineers, meanwhile, were 
advocating a free-flying machine, although they only had ideas, and 
no drawings for such a machine.2  
Both parties ultimately dismissed tethered flight because it 
could not adequately simulate the motions they felt necessary for 
the mission. Helicopters were soon discounted as well. While at first 
glance helicopters appear useful, thrust vector created by the rotor 
blades would not allow for large attitude excursions needed for 
lunar simulation. It also created a coupling between lift and attitude 
control that would be hard to mask.  
The FRC and Bell also rejected an off-the-shelf visual simulator 
because of its inability to offer valid motion cues, meaning visual 
and especially physical motion cues, which they deemed important 
to the project. In the end both NASA and Bell independently turned 
                                                
2 Project 1055, Proposal for the Development of a Soft Landing Vehicle U.S. Naval 
Ordnance Test Station, China Lake, California, 5 October, 1961. 
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to a free-flying simulator. Bell engineers proposed a light frame in 
which hung a double gimbaled engine to provide vertical lift. 
Strategically located rocket motors would provide deceleration and 
translational forces, all of which would simulate controlled flight in 
the lunar environment.3 
Bell’s proposal was accepted and funded by NASA in 1962, and 
the company set to work designing and building the machine, 
dubbed the Lunar Landing Research Vehicle.   
The Lunar Landing Research Vehicle, or LLRV, had a General 
Electric CF-700, the fan jet version of the J-85, mounted inside two 
gimbaled rings. The dual gimbals enabled the engine to provide true 
vertical thrust—perpendicular to the Earth’s surface—while allowing 
the cockpit and truss to rotate freely in pitch and roll up to 40 
degrees. Eight thrusters were clustered around the gimbal frame 
where they served as lift rockets, capable of producing 500lbs of 
thrust each. These were used for lift when flying a lunar landing 
simulation. For maneuvering, the engineers chose sixteen smaller 
thrusters, four at each corner of the vehicle. These were fired in 
pairs, one up and one down at opposite corners of the vehicle. Half 
                                                
3 Bell study report, Feasibility Study for a Lunar Landing Research Vehicle Bell 
Aerosystems Report 7161-950001, 8 March 1962. 
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of the 16 thrusters were adjustable on the ground to vary their 
thrust between 18-90 lbs. so they could find which setting was best 
suited for training. The pilot could select one set or the other. 
Given the precarious nature of this craft and the risks 
involved, they also decided to add three emergency recovery-and-
escape systems. First, eight emergency thrusters were added to the 
frame to arrest the vehicle’s descent in an emergency, and 
particularly at touchdown. Fired all at once they generated 3000 lbs 
of thrust. Second, and meant to be used in conjunction with the 
emergency rockets, was a mortar-deployed parachute attached to 
the frame designed to lower the entire vehicle at 33.4 feet per 
second. The logic here was that the craft, so rare and yet so 
essential, was worth saving at all costs. Third, the pilot sat on a 
Weber zero-zero ejection seat. The entire system was designed to 
save the LLRV in a free fall, with one small caveat:  it only worked 
well above an altitude of 200 feet—which turned out to be the 
typical altitude for the start of a lunar simulation profile. Below 200 
feet the mortar parachute could not be deployed in time to save the 
vehicle. Furthermore, in order for this mortar parachute to do its 
job the pilot had to remain with the vehicle to activate the lift 
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rockets at touchdown and completely arrest the descent. Because 
the emergency-lift thrusters were powered by the same propellant 
all the other thrusters used, a drop in propellant might occur just 
when that propellant was needed to arrest the descent of the LLRV. 
Even worse, once the recovery parachute was deployed, the ejection 
seat could not be fired because the pilot would not be able to clear 
the vehicle without becoming entangled in the chute.  
The arrangement was less-than-ideal, and eventually the 
emergency lift rockets and vehicle recovery parachute were 
discarded in favor of just the ejection seat. Management finally 
accepted that the pilot was more valuable than the machine—and 
since the pilots of the LLTV, or Training Vehicle, were to be 
astronauts, this wasn’t a stretch.  
The craft carried two fuels: JP-4 for the jet and a 90% pure 
solution of hydrogen peroxide (H2O2) for the thrusters, which was 
pressurized with helium to ensure a constant flow to the thrusters. 
NASA had used H2O2 for two decades by then, most recently in the 
Reaction Control System’s maneuvering thrusters on the X-15 when 
it was outside the Earth’s atmosphere; using it on the LLRV came 
naturally.   
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Bell delivered the first LLRV to the FRC in the spring of 1964. 
The second vehicle followed not long after. Ground tests began once 
the first vehicle was uncrated and assembled, and in October of that 
year Joe Walker, the Center’s chief pilot, took the LLRV up for its 
first flight. In its final configuration for the program the CF-700 put 
out 4200lb of thrust under ideal conditions, barely enough for a 
thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.05/1. The team quickly shifted flights to 
dawn, taking advantage of the cooler air for greater thrust.   
Perhaps more remarkable than anything else about it, the 
LLRV was a fly-by-wire aircraft—one of the very first—controlled by 
three electronic, albeit analog computers. There was no mechanical 
backup control system of any kind, setting the LLRV apart from the 
few other electronic flight control programs in existence. Artificial 
force gradients were part of the controls for acceptable sensory 
characteristics. The fly-by-wire system allowed them to maximize 
the number of control parameters that could be varied during 
flight-testing, and the changes could be made on site.   
The LLRV’s Flight Control Systems had two purposes: vehicle 
attitude control, and jet engine stabilization. The engine 
stabilization computer controlled the primary means of lift. In 
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operation the FCS had to manipulate the engine in four different 
modes. Gimbal-locked was for takeoff and emergencies, centering 
the jet and locking it there. In lunar simulation the FCS directed the 
engine to remain perpendicular to the Earth, yet automatically 
deflect to counter aerodynamic forces. The thrust-to-weight 
calculator established the vehicle’s weight before lunar simulation, 
something only done in flight. And the auto-throttle controlled the 
jet’s thrust in lunar simulation mode, not only countering 5/6th 
gravity, but also accounting for both fuel burn-off and thrust 
propellant expenditure throughout the flight to keep the thrust at a 
constant in simulation.  
The LLRV’s attitude-control system itself had three separate 
components. An attitude-rocket system for generating control moments; a 
primary and backup electronic systems for controlling operation of the 
attitude-control rockets, and; a monitoring system containing failure-
detection circuitry for monitoring system performance and 
reconfiguration in case of failure.4 Engineers separated the redundant 
electronic systems to boost reliability, housing all three independently in 
                                                
4 Calvin R. Jarvis, Flight-Test Evaluation of an On-Off Rate Command Attitude Control 
System of a Manned Lunar-Landing Research Vehicle (Washington, D.C: NASA TN D–
3903, April, 1967); Donald R. Bellman and Gene J. Matranga, Design and Operational 
Characteristics of a Lunar-Landing Research Vehicle (Washington, D.C: NASA TN D–
3023, 1965). 
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assemblies at the rear of the vehicle. A series of gyros, some of which 
could be nulled in flight after erection, provided feedback for the flight 
computers. 
During operations the primary FCS for vehicle attitude control was 
designed to automatically switch to the backup mode if it detected a 
failure or anomaly. There were times, however, when the pilot had to 
manually make the switch since the system did not always detect the 
failure. The backup FCS was a single-string system with no failure 
detection: if it failed, the pilot had to manually return to the primary 
system. An anomaly detection monitor compared the primary and backup 
systems and if a discrepancy of longer than 150 milliseconds occurred, it 
commanded a switch the backup. And then, only the failed axis 
transferred to backup. A mobile ground unit monitored operations, 
receiving telemetered data throughout the flight.  
LLRV flights usually lasted no more than about 8 minutes, 
after which the JP-4 and H2O2 were nearly exhausted. And while 
capable of climbing higher, the flights rarely went above 200-300 
feet. 
Because the LLRV’s jet engine could barely lift the aircraft, the 
pilots were carefully weighed at the start of the program; one of 
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them had the habit of eating well and had to lose weight in order to 
participate. Cans of lead shot were added to the vehicle for a lighter 
pilot and removed for a heavier one so that the vehicle remained 
balanced. And each sat on a custom cushion so their mass, 
measured at the Weber factory, was consistently located.  
Initially the controls were like those of a helicopter: a center 
stick, a side stick (cyclic), and rudder pedals. Within three months, 
however, engineers and mechanics at the FRC had replaced these 
with two side sticks that better emulated the controls of the 
emerging lunar module. The left stick still controlled the lift 
thrusters and the jet engine (when not in lunar simulation) while 
the right stick now controlled all the maneuvering thrusters, 
eliminating the rudder pedals.  
A typical flight in the LLRV began when the pilot lifted off 
vertically and climbed to 200’ above ground level. He engaged the 
program that weighed the entire machine, including pilot. To do 
this the computer commanded a brief surge in the jet; 
accelerometers measured the vehicle’s upward motion and the 
computer summed this measurement with engine thrust, the known 
weight of the vehicle at start up, as well as other factors, and then 
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calculated the weight of the vehicle at that moment. Once weighed, 
the lunar simulation program automatically reduced jet thrust to 
cancel just 5/6th of the Earth’s gravity. But since both fuel and 
thruster propellant were being consumed throughout the flight the 
FCS had to calculated the fuel and thruster consumption at a 
standard rate to keep the simulation realistic. Just as importantly, 
accelerometers recognized side forces on the LLRV and fed this 
information to the FCS, which automatically fired the thrusters or 
tilted the jet to cancel them out.   
In Lunar Simulation Mode all of this was invisible to the pilot, 
who was busy using both hands to control and maneuver the LLRV 
toward a landing.  Now weighed and in simulation mode it was up to 
the pilot to keep the LLRV in the air. He flew a machine that felt as 
close to being in lunar gravity as one could on Earth, as well as in 
the absence of an atmosphere.   
The pilot’s left hand commanded the large thrusters located 
around the gimbals that now emulated the lift rockets on the LM. 
With his right hand he manipulated the maneuvering thrusters that 
fired bursts of steam for control. Once at altitude the objective was 
 14 
to initiate a steady descent to a landing further down the flight line, 
and it was anything but an easy task. 
Beginning in 1964, over the next 2½ years three pilots at the 
Center flew the aircraft: Joe Walker, Don Mallick, and Jack Kluever. 
The flight research program led to many changes in the vehicle, 
from how the machine responded to control inputs to an almost 
fully enclosed cockpit, the better to simulate the LM pilot’s. All told, 
vehicle no. 1 flew 245 missions; vehicle no. 2 flew six times, all at 
Dryden. 
Changes to the LLRV were incorporated into the plans for 
three LLTV, or Training Vehicles, which Bell was asked to construct 
and deliver to the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston, starting in 
1966. LLRV no. 1 was modified into LLTV and sent to Houston for 
astronaut training; although modified likes its sibling, LLRV No. 2 it 
remained at the FRC where it was cannibalized for parts. Meanwhile 
two pilots from the MSC, Bud Ream and Joe Algranti, came to the 
FRC to be qualified in the LLRV since they would lead the astronaut 
training in Houston. The two pilots found what each of the three 
FRC pilots had found—as would all the others—no matter how good 
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the instructions were, your first lift-off as PIC was also your first lift-
off. There was no second seat.  
The plan was for each Apollo crew heading for the moon to 
spend time flying the LLTVs as their launch approached. That way 
both astronauts were qualified to fly the LM all the way down. In 
practice, however, only the LM commander flew the LLTV with any 
frequency—in Aldrin and Armstrong’s case, for example, Aldrin 
hardly ever flew the LLTV. 
By March of 1967 only a handful of flights had taken place at 
the Manned Spacecraft Center before the loss of Apollo 1 on the 
launch pad froze flight training until the accident had been solved 
and a sweeping review of flight safety was complete. On top of this, 
once flying did resume, the MSC suffered a string of accidents with 
the LLTVs, the first involving Neil Armstrong, in 1968.  
Were the LLRV and later LLTV worthwhile?  The comments of 
the astronauts themselves are perhaps the best measure of this. 
Neil Armstrong said that, because of the LLRV and LLTV, when 
it came to finally landing on the moon: “I felt very comfortable -- I 
felt at home. I felt like I was flying something I was used to and it 
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was doing the things that it ought to be doing. [The moon] was not 
the kind of place I wanted to try to make the first landing.”5 
Pete Conrad: “In my case, there were a couple of times I had to 
get [the LLTV] stopped and I only had 60 seconds to do it, and it's 
not a question of saying ‘reset the simulator; I blew that one.’ There 
is no other way you can get that confidence. Were I to go back to the 
moon, I personally would want to fly the LLTV again as close to 
flight time as practical.”6 
 The LLRV’s legacy is more than simply preparing astronauts 
for landing on the moon, however. It’s most consequential impact 
was on fly-by-wire technology. The first attempt at controlling a 
aircraft strictly with a computer was the Canadian CF-105 Arrow. 
But that program was cancelled in 1959, before it ever entered 
service. The second attempt came in 1972 when both the Air Force 
and NASA independently modified aircraft with fly-by-wire controls. 
The AF chose an F-4 Phantom onto which they grafted a digital fly-
by-wire system. NASA, on the other hand, took a Chance Vought F-8 
                                                
5 Neil A. Armstrong, “Wingless on Luna” delivered at the Wings Club, New York City, 
1988, 1988.  
6 NASA MSC minutes of meeting of Flight Readiness Review Board, Lunar Landing 
Training Vehicle, Houston, 12 January 1970, cited in Gene J. Matranga, C. Wayne 
Ottinger, and Calvin R. Jarvis, Unconventional, Contrary, and Ugly: The Lunar Landing 
Research Vehicle with Christian Gelzer, NASA Monograph in Aerospace History #35, 
SP-2204-4535, (Washington, D.C.: 2006), Appendix D, 172-178, 
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Crusader and removed ALL the mechanical and hydraumechanical 
links, then placed a digital computer in the gun bay, where it acted 
as the flight control unit.7 This was the first truly digital fly-by-wire 
aircraft ever to fly; the Air Force chose to keep the mechanical 
system in place on its F-4 as a backup, whereas NASA’s F-8 had 
none. The engineers and program managers’ logic was that if they 
left in a back up no one would be convinced of the system’s 
potential or take seriously what they were trying to demonstrate. 
Besides, its engineers had considerable experience with an all-fly-by-
wire system: the LLRV. Even more groundbreaking was that the LLRV 
introduced electronically controlled engines as well as flight 
controls, something that Dryden would work with again two decades 
later. 
There is a final and somewhat charming twist to the 
LLRV/digital fly-by-wire program. Conceived by Dryden engineers in 
1970, they relied on the command module computer on Apollo 15 
that had then only recently returned to Earth, which they put in the 
F-8 for its first series of experiments.8  
  
                                                
7 See James E. Tomayko, Computers Take Flight: A History of NASA’s Pioneering 
Digital Fly-By-Wire Project, (Washington, D.C.: 2000). 
8 Ibid. 
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